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Synthesis of Non-Interferent Timed Systems⋆
Gilles Benattar1, Franck Cassez2,⋆⋆, Didier Lime1, Olivier H.Roux1
1 IRCCyN/CNRS, BP 92101, 1 rue de la Noë, 44321 Nantes Cedex 3, France
2 National ICT Australia & CNRS, Univ. of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Abstract. In this paper, we focus on the synthesis of secure timed systems which
are given by timed automata. The security property that the system must sat-
isfy is a non-interference property. Various notions of non-interference have been
defined in the literature, and in this paper we focus on Strong Non-deterministic
Non-Interference (SNNI) and we study the two following problems: (1) check
whether it is possible to enforce a system to be SNNI; if yes (2) compute a sub-
system which is SNNI.
Key words: Non-Interference, Synthesis, Timed Automaton.
1 Introduction
Modern computing environments allow the use of programs that are sent or fetched
from different sites. Such programs may deal with secret information such as private
data (of a user) or as classified data (of an organization). One of the basic concerns in
such context is to ensure that the programs do not leak sensitive data to a third party,
either maliciously or inadvertently. This is often called secrecy.
In an environment with two parties, information flow analysis defines secrecy as:
“high-level information never flows into low-level channels”. Such a definition is re-
ferred to as a non-interference property, and may capture any causal dependency bet-
ween high-level and low-level behaviors.
We assume that there are two users and the set of actions of the system S is par-
titioned into Σh (high-level actions) and Σl (low-level actions). The non-interference
properties, namely strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI), cosimulation-ba-
sed strong non-deterministic non-interference (CSNNI) and bisimulation-based strong
non-deterministic non-interference (BSNNI), are out of the scope of the common sa-
fety/liveness classification of system properties [1]. The non-interference verification
problem, for a given system S, consists in checking whether S is non-interferent.
In recent years, verification of information flow security properties has been a very
active domain [1,2] as it can be applied to the analysis of cryptographic protocols where
numerous uniform and concise characterizations of information flow security properties
(e.g. confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation or anonymity) in terms of non-
interference have been proposed. For example, the Needham-Schroeder protocol can
be proved unsecure by defining the security property using SNNI [3].
⋆ Work supported by the French Government undergrant ANR-SETI-003.
⋆⋆ Author supported by a Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship within the 7th European
Community Framework Programme.
In this paper, we consider the problem of synthesizing non-interferent timed sys-
tems. In contrast to verification, the non-interference synthesis problem assumes the
system is open i.e., we can restrict the behaviors of S: some events, in a particular set
Σc, of S can be disabled. The non-interference control problem for a system S asks
the following: “Is there a controller C s.t. C(S) is non-interferent?” The associated
non-interference controller synthesis problem asks to compute a witness mapping C.
Related Work. In [4] the authors consider the complexity of many non-interference
verification problems but synthesis is not addressed. In [5] an exponential time decision
procedure for checking whether a finite state system satisfies a given Basic Security
Predicate (BSP) is presented but the synthesis problem is not addressed. There is also
a large body of work on the use of static analysis techniques to enforce information
flow policies. A general overview can be found in [6]. The non-interference synthesis
problem was first considered in [7] for dense-time systems specified by timed automata.
The non-interference property considered in [7] is the state non-interference property,
which is less demanding than the one we consider here.
This paper is a follow-up of our previous work [8] about non-interference control
problems for untimed systems. In [8], we assumed that the security domains coincided
with the controllable and uncontrollable actions: high-level actions (Σh) could be dis-
abled (Σc = Σh) whereas low-level actions (Σl) could not. We studied the synthesis
problems for SNNI and BSNNI and proved they are decidable. In the present paper
we extend the previous work in two directions: (1) we release the constraint Σc = Σh
and (2) consider the synthesis problem for timed automata. Nevertheless we restrict the
class of non-interference properties to SNNI.
The motivations for this work are manyfold. Releasing Σc = Σh is interesting in
practice because it enables one to specify that an action from Σh cannot be disabled
(a service must be given), while some actions of Σl can be disabled. We can view
actions of Σl as capabilities of the low-level user (e.g., pressing a button), and it thus
makes sense to prevent the user from using the button for instance by disabling/hiding
it temporarily.
It is also of theoretical interest, because this non-interference synthesis problem
is really more difficult than the corresponding verification problem in the sense that
we can reduce the SNNI verification problem to a particular instance of the synthesis
problem: we just have to take Σc = ∅. This was not the case for the versions of the
synthesis problems studied in [8].
We start by studying the SNNI synthesis problem for timed automata because SNNI
is a rather simple notion of interference. Still as said earlier, it is expressive enough for
example to prove that the Needham-Schroeder protocol is flawed [3]. Controller syn-
thesis enables one to find automatically the patch(es) to apply to make such a protocol
secure. The use of dense-time to model the system clearly gives a more accurate and
realistic model for the system and a potential attacker that can measure time.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we first exhibit a class dTA of timed automata for
which the SNNI verification problem is decidable. The other results are: (1) we prove
that deciding whether there is controller C for A such that (s.t. in the following) C(A)
is SNNI, is decidable for the previous class dTA; (2) we reduce the SNNI synthesis
problem to solving a sequence of safety timed games.
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Organization of the paper. Section 2 recalls the basics of timed automata, timed lan-
guages and some results on safety timed games. Section 3 gives the definition of the
non-interference synthesis problem we are interested in. Section 4 contains the main
result: we show that there is a largest subsystem which is SNNI and this subsystem
is effectively computable. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and give a list of open
problems and future work.
2 Preliminaries
Let R+ be the set of non-negative reals and N the set of integers. Let X be a finite set
of positive real-valued variables called clocks. A valuation of the variables in X is a
function X → R+, that can be written as a vector of RX+ . We let 0X be the valuation
s.t. 0X(x) = 0 for each x ∈ X and use 0 when X is clear from the context. Given
a valuation v and R ⊆ X , v[R 7→ 0] is the valuation s.t. v[R 7→ 0](x) = v(x) if
x 6∈ R and 0 otherwise. An atomic constraint (over X) is of the form x ∼ c, with
x ∈ X , ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >} and c ∈ N. A (convex) formula is a conjunction of
atomic constraints. C(X) is the set of convex formulas. Given a valuation v (over X)
and a formula γ over X , γ(v) is the truth value, in B = {true, false}, of γ when
each symbol x in γ is replaced by v(x). If t ∈ R+, we let v + t be the valuation
s.t. (v + t)(x) = v(x) + t. Let |V | be the cardinality of the set V .
Let Σ be a finite set, ε 6∈ Σ and Σε = Σ ∪ {ε}. A timed word w over Σ is a
sequence w = (δ0, a0)(δ1, a1) · · · (δn, an) s.t. (δi, ai) ∈ R+ ×Σ for 0 ≤ i ≤ n where
δi represents the amount of time elapsed3 between ai−1 and ai. TΣ∗ is the set of timed
words over Σ. We denote by uv the concatenation of two timed words u and v. As
usual ε is also the empty word s.t. (δ1, ε)(δ2, a) = (δ1 + δ2, a). Given a timed word
w ∈ TΣ∗ and L ⊆ Σ the projection of w over L is denoted by πL(w) and is defined
by πL(w) = (δ0, b0)(δ1, b1) · · · (δn, bn) with bi = ai if ai ∈ L and bi = ε otherwise.
The untimed projection of w, Untimed(w), is the word a0a1 · · · an of Σ∗.
A timed language is a subset of TΣ∗. Let L be a timed language, the untimed
language of L is Untimed(L) = {v ∈ Σ∗ | ∃w ∈ L s.t. v = Untimed(w)}.
A timed transition system (TTS) is a tuple S = (S, s0, Σε,→) where S is a set of
states, s0 is the initial state, Σ a finite alphabet of actions, →⊆ S × Σε ∪ R+ × S is
the transition relation. We use the notation s e−→ s′ if (s, e, s′) ∈→ and impose that for
each s ∈ S, s 0−→ s.
A run ρ of S from s is a finite sequence of transitions ρ = q0
e1−→ q1
e2−→ · · ·
en−→ qn
s.t. q0 = s0 and (qi, ei, qi+1) ∈→ for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. We denote by last(ρ) the
last state of the sequence i.e., the state qn. We let Runs(s,S) be the set of runs from
s in S and Runs(S) = Runs(s0,S). We write q0
∗
−→ qn if there is a run from q0
to qn. The set of reachable states in Runs(S) is Reach(S) = {s | s0
∗
−→ s}. Each
run can be written in a normal form where delay and discrete transitions alternate
i.e., ρ = q0
δ0−→
e0−→ q1
δ1−→
e1−→ · · ·
δn−→
en−→ qn+1
δ
−→ q′n+1. The trace of ρ is trace(ρ) =
(δ0, e0)(δ1, e1) · · · (δn, en).
3 For i = 0 this is the amount of time since the system started.
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A timed automaton (TA) is a tuple A = (Q, q0, X,Σε, E, Inv) where: q0 ∈ Q is
the initial location; X is a finite set of positive real-valued clocks; Σε is a finite set of
actions; E ⊆ Q×C(X)×Σε× 2X ×Q is a finite set of edges. An edge (q, γ, a,R, q′)
goes from q to q′, with the guard γ ∈ C(X), the action a and the reset set R ⊆ X;
Inv : Q→ C(X) is a function that assigns an invariant to any location; we require that
the atomic formulas of an invariant are of the form x ∼ c with ∼∈ {<,≤}.
A finite (or untimed) automaton A = (Q, q0, Σε, E) is a special kind of timed
automaton with X = ∅, and consequently all the guards and invariants are vacuously
true. A timed automaton A is deterministic if for (q1, γ, a,R, q2), (q1, γ′, a, R′, q′2) ∈
E, γ∧γ′ 6= false ⇒ q2 = q′2 and R = R′. We recall that timed automata cannot always
be determinized (i.e., find a deterministic TA which accepts the same language as a
non-deterministic one, see [9]), and moreover, checking whether a timed automaton is
determinizable is undecidable [10]. The semantics of a timed automatonA = (Q, q0, X,
Σε, E, Inv) is the TTS SA = (Q × RX+ , (q0,0), Σε,→) defined in the usual way. If
s = (q, v) is a state of SA, we denote by s+δ the (only) state reached after δ time units,
i.e., s+ δ = (q, v+ δ). The sets of runs of A is defined as Runs(A) = Runs(SA) where
SA is the semantics of A. A timed word w ∈ TΣ∗ is generated by A if w = trace(ρ)
for some ρ ∈ Runs(A). The timed language generated by A, L(A), is the set of timed
words generated by A. Two automata A and B are language equivalent, denoted by
A ≈ B, if L(A) = L(B) i.e., they generate the same set of timed words.
Let A1 = (Q1, q01, X1, Σε, E1, Inv1) and A2 = (Q2, q02, X2, Σε, E2, Inv2) be
two TA withX1∩X2 = ∅. Let L ⊆ Σ. The synchronized product ofA1 andA2 w.r.t. L,
is the timed automaton A1 ×L A2 = (Q, q0, X,Σε, E, Inv) defined in the usual way
(synchronization occurs only for actions in L). When it is clear from the context we
omit the subscript L in ×L.
In the sequel we will use two operators on TA: the first one gives an abstracted
automaton and simply hides a set of labels L ⊆ Σ. Given a TA A = (Q, q0, X,Σε, E,
Inv) and L ⊆ Σ we define the TA A/L = (Q, q0, X, (Σ\L)ε, EL, Inv) where
(q, γ, a,R, q′) ∈ EL ⇐⇒ (q, γ, a,R, q
′) ∈ E for a ∈ Σ\L and (q, γ, ε, R, q′) ∈
EL ⇐⇒ (q, γ, a,R, q
′) ∈ E for a ∈ L ∪ {ε}. The restricted automaton cuts trans-
itions labeled by the letters in L ⊆ Σ: Given a TA A = (Q, q0, X,Σ,E, Inv) and
L ⊆ Σ we define the TA A\L = (Q, q0, X,Σ\L,EL, Inv) where (q, γ, a,R, q′) ∈
EL ⇐⇒ (q, γ, a,R, q
′) ∈ E for a ∈ Σ\L.
We will also use some results on safety control for timed games which have been
introduced and solved in [11].
A Timed Game Automaton (TGA) A = (Q, q0, X,Σ,E, Inv) is a timed automaton
with its set of actions Σ partitioned into controllable (Σc) and uncontrollable (Σu)
actions. Let A be a TGA and Bad ⊆ Q× RX+ be the set of bad states to avoid. Bad can
be written ∪1≤i≤k(ℓi, Zi), with each Zi defined as a conjunction of formulas of C(X)
and each ℓi ∈ Q . The safety control problem for (A,Bad) is: decide wether there is a
controller to constantly avoid Bad. Let λ be a fresh special symbol not in Σε denoting
the action “do nothing”.
A controller C for A is a partial function from Runs(A) to 2Σc∪{λ}. We require
that ∀ρ ∈ Runs(A), if a ∈ C(ρ) ∩ Σc then last(ρ)
a
−→ (q′, v′) for some (q′, v′) and
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if λ ∈ C(ρ) then last(ρ) δ−→ (q′, v′) for some δ > 0. A controller C is state-based or
memoryless whenever ∀ρ, ρ′ ∈ Runs(A), last(ρ) = last(ρ′) implies that C(ρ) = C(ρ′).
Remark 1. We assume a controller gives a set of actions that are enabled which differs
from standard definitions [11] where a controller only gives one action. Nevertheless
for safety timed games, one computes a most permissive controller (if there is one)
which gives for each state the largest set of actions which are safe. It follows that any
reasonable (e.g., Non-Zeno) sub-controller of this most permissive controller avoids the
set of bad states.
C(A) defines “A supervised/restricted by C” and is inductively defined by its set of
runs:
– (q0,0) ∈ Runs(C(A)),
– if ρ ∈ Runs(C(A)) and ρ e−→ s′ ∈ Runs(A), then ρ e−→ s′ ∈ Runs(C(A)) if one
of the following three conditions holds:
1. e ∈ Σu,
2. e ∈ Σc ∩ C(ρ),
3. e ∈ R+ and ∀δ s.t. 0 ≤ δ < e, last(ρ)
δ
−→ last(ρ) + δ ∧ λ ∈ C(ρ δ−→
last(ρ) + δ).
C(A) can also be viewed as a TTS where each state is a run of A and the trans-
itions are given by the previous definition. C is a winning controller for (A,Bad) if
Reach(C(A))∩Bad = ∅. For safety timed games, the results are the following [11,12]:
– it is decidable (EXPTIME-complete) whether there is a winning controller for a
safety game (A,Bad);
– in case there is one, there is a most permissive controller which is memoryless on
the region graph of the TGA A. This most permissive controller can be represented
by a TA. This also means that the set of runs of C(A) is itself the semantics of a
timed automaton, that can be effectively built from A.
3 Non-Interference Synthesis Problem
The strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI) property has been first proposed
by Focardi [1] as a trace-based generalization of non-interference for concurrent sys-
tems. In the sequel, we assume A = (Q, q,X,Σh ∪ Σl, E, Inv) is a timed automaton
where Σl (resp. Σh) is the set of public (resp. private) actions and we let Σ = Σh∪Σl.
Definition 1 (SNNI). A has the strong non-deterministic non-interference property (in
short “A is SNNI”) if A/Σh ≈ A\Σh. 
The SNNI verification problem (SNNI-VP) asks to check whether a system A is SNNI.
Example 1 (SNNI). Figure 1 gives examples of systems A(k) which are SNNI and not
SNNI depending on the value of integer k. The high-level actions are Σh = {h} and
the low-level actions are Σl = {l}. (δ, l) with 1 ≤ δ < 2 is a trace of A(1)/Σh but not
of A(1)\Σh and so, A(1) is not SNNI. A(2) is SNNI as we can see that A(2)/Σh ≈
A(2)\Σh. Note that A(k) without the clock constraints, then it is SNNI. 
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Remark 2. Let Lh = Σ∗l ΣhΣ∗. Then L(A\Σh) = L(A)\Lh. Also L(A/Σh) =
πΣl(L(A)). This shows that SNNI is really a language property as if L(A) = L(B),
then A is SNNI iff B is SNNI.
0
1
2
3
l, x ≥ 2
h, x ≥ k
l
Fig. 1. Automaton A(k)
We anticipate on the definition of the SNNI con-
trol problem (SNNI-CP): in general, control prob-
lems are more difficult than the corresponding veri-
fication problems and this is the case for the SNNI-
CP. Thus we cannot expect to solve the SNNI-CP if
the SNNI-VP is undecidable. The SNNI-VP for TA
consists in checking whether a TA is SNNI. It was
proved in [7] that the SNNI-VP is undecidable for
non deterministic timed automata. We first refine this
result and exhibit a class of TA for the SNNI-VP is decidable. Let dTA be the set of TA
A s.t. A\Σh is deterministic (membership in dTA can be checked syntactically).
Theorem 1. The SNNI-VP is PSPACE-complete for dTA.
The proof of PSPACE-hardness consists in reducing the language inclusion problem
L(B) ⊆ L(A) withA a deterministic TA, which is PSPACE-complete [9], to the SNNI-
VP. PSPACE-easiness is proved along the same lines.
Proof. L(A\Σh) ⊆ L(A/Σh) is always true. Checking whether L(B) ⊆ L(A) with A
a deterministic TA is PSPACE-complete [9]. Thus checking if L(A/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh)
can be done in PSPACE for dTA and the SNNI-VP is thus in PSPACE.
•
iA
• iB
h
A
B
Fig. 2. Timed Automaton D
For PSPACE-hardness, we reduce the language in-
clusion problem L(B) ⊆ L(A) with A a determin-
istic TA, to the SNNI-VP. Let A be a deterministic
timed automaton (initial location iA) defined over
Σl and B a timed automaton (initial location iB)
defined over Σl. We let D be the timed automaton
over Σl ∪ Σh, with Σh = {h} and h 6∈ Σl, defined
as in Figure 2. It follows that L(B) ⊆ L(A) ⇐⇒
D is SNNI. =⇒ holds because if L(B) ⊆ L(A) then
L(D/Σh) = L(B) ∪ L(A) = L(A) = L(D\Σh).
For the converse ⇐=, if D is SNNI L(A) ∪ L(B) = L(D/Σh), and as L(D/Σh) =
L(D\Σh) = L(A) we get L(B) ⊆ L(A). 
This reduction of language inclusion to the SNNI-VP also holds for finite automata.
For finite non-deterministic automata, checking language inclusion is in PSPACE [13].
It follows that the SNNI-VP is in PSPACE for non-deterministic A\Σh and in PTIME
for deterministic A\Σh. Table 1 summarizes the results for the SNNI-VP.
The previous non-interference verification problem (SNNI-VP), consists in check-
ing whether an automaton A has the non-interference property. If the answer is “no”,
one has to investigate why the non-interference property is not true, modify A and
check the property again. In contrast to the verification problem, the synthesis problem
indicates whether there is a way of restricting the behavior of users to ensure a given
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Finite Automata Timed Automata
A\Σh Deterministic PTIME PSPACE-Complete
A\Σh Non-Deterministic PSPACE-Complete Undecidable [7]
Table 1. Results for the SNNI-VP
property. Thus we consider that only some actions in the set Σc, with Σc ⊆ Σh ∪ Σl,
are controllable and can be disabled. We let Σu = Σ \ Σc denote the actions that are
uncontrollable and thus cannot be disabled.
Recall that a controller C for A gives for each run ρ of A the set C(ρ) ∈ 2Σc∪{λ}
of actions that are enabled after this particular run. The SNNI-Control Problem (SNNI-
CP) we are interested in is the following:
Is there a controller C s.t. C(A) is SNNI ? (SNNI-CP)
The SNNI-Controller Synthesis Problem (SNNI-CSP) asks to compute a witness
when the answer to the SNNI-CP is “yes”.
4 Algorithms for the Synthesis Problems
4.1 Preliminary Remarks
First we motivate our definition of controllers which
0
3
1
2
a
h
a
Fig. 3. Automaton D
are mappings from Runs(A) to 2Σc∪{λ}. The common
definition of a controller in the literature is a mapping
from Runs(A) to Σc ∪ {λ}. Indeed, for the safety (or
reachability) control problem, one can compute a map-
ping M : Runs(A) → 2Σc∪{λ} (most permissive con-
troller), and a controller C ensures the safety goal iff
C(ρ) ∈ M(ρ). This implies that any sub-controller of
M is a good controller. This is not the case for SNNI, even for finite automata, as the
following example shows.
Example 2. Let us consider the automaton D of Figure 3 with Σc = {a, h}. The largest
sub-system of D which is SNNI is D itself. Disabling a from state 0 will result in an
automaton which is not SNNI. 
We are thus interested in computing the largest (if there is such) sub-system of A
that we can control which is SNNI. Second, in our definition we allow a controller to
forbid any controllable action. In contrast, in the literature, a controller should ensure
some liveness and never block the system. In the context of security property, it makes
sense to disable everything if the security policy cannot be enforced otherwise. This
makes the SNNI-CP easy for finite automata.
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Theorem 2. For finite automata, the SNNI-CP is PSPACE-Complete.
The proof consists in proving that if a finite automaton can be restricted to be SNNI,
then disabling all the Σc actions is a solution. Thus the SNNI-CP reduces to the SNNI-
VP and the result follows.
Proof. As time is not taken into acount in untimed automaton, we can have C(ρ) = ∅
for finite automaton (for general timed automaton, this would mean that we block the
time.) The proof of the theorem consists in proving that if a finite automaton can be
restricted to be SNNI, then disabling all the Σc actions is a solution. Let C∀ be the
controller defined by C∀(ρ) = ∅. We prove the following: if C is a controller s.t. C(A)
is SNNI, then C∀(A) is SNNI.
Assume a finite automaton D is SNNI. Let e ∈ Σh ∪ Σl and let Le be the set of
words containing at least one e. Depending on the type of e we have:
– if e ∈ Σl, then L((D\{e})\Σh) = L(D\Σh) \ Le and as D is SNNI, it is also
equal to L(D/Σh) \ Le = L((D\{e})/Σh);
– if e ∈ Σh, L((D\{e})/Σh) ⊆ L(D/Σh) = L(D\Σh) = L((D\{e})\Σh).
So, if D is SNNI, D\L is SNNI, ∀L ⊆ Σ. By remark 2, since L(C∀(D)) = L(D\Σc),
if D is SNNI, then D\Σc is also SNNI and therefore C∀(D) is SNNI.
Let A be the TA we want to restrict. Assume there is a controller C s.t. C(A) is
SNNI. C∀(C(A)) is SNNI so C∀(C(A)) = C∀(A) is also SNNI which means that
A\Σc is SNNI. This proves that: ∃C s.t. C(A) is SNNI ⇔ A\Σc is SNNI.
It is then equivalent to check that A\Σc is SNNI to solve the SNNI-CP for A and
this can be done in PSPACE. PSPACE-hardness comes from the reduction of SNNI-VP
to SNNI-CP, by taking Σc = ∅. 
Theorem 2 does not hold for timed automata as the following example demonstrates.
Example 3. Figure 4 gives an example of a timed automaton H with high-level actions
Σh = {h} and low-level actions Σl = {a, b}.
Assume Σc = {a}. Notice that H\Σc is not
0
1
2
3
a, x > 1
h, x > 4
b
Fig. 4. The Automaton H
SNNI. Let the state based controller C be de-
fined by: C(0, x) = {a, λ} when H is in state
(0, x) with x < 4; and C(0, x) = {a} when
x = 4. Then C(H) is SNNI. In this example,
when x = 4 we prevent time from elapsing by
forcing the firing of a which indirectly disables
action h. To do this we just have to add an in-
variant [x ≤ 4] to location 0 of H and this cuts out the dashed transitions rendering
C(H) SNNI. 
4.2 Algorithms for SNNI-CP and SNNI-CSP
In this section we first prove that the SNNI-CP is EXPTIME-hard for dTA. Then we
give an EXPTIME algorithm to solve the SNNI-CP and SNNI-CSP.
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Theorem 3. For dTA, the SNNI-CP is EXPTIME-Hard.
Proof. The safety control problem for TA is EXPTIME-hard [14]. In the proof of this
theorem, T.A. Henzinger and P.W. Kopke use timed automata where the controller
chooses an action and the environment resolves non-determinism. The hardness proof
reduces the halting problem for alternating Turing Machines using polynomial space
to a safety control problem. In our framework, we use TA with controllable and un-
controllable actions. It is not difficult to adapt the hardness proof of [14] to TA which
are deterministic w.r.t. Σc actions and non deterministic w.r.t. Σu actions. As Σu trans-
itions can never be disabled (they act only as spoiling actions), we can use a different
label for each uncontrollable transition without altering the result in our definition of
the safety control problem. Hence: the safety control problem as defined in section 2
is EXPTIME-hard for deterministic TA (with controllable and uncontrollable trans-
itions). This problem can be reduced to the safety control problem of TA with only one
state bad. We can now reduce the safety control problem for deterministic TA which
is EXPTIME-hard to the SNNI control problem on dTA. Let A = (Q ∪ {bad}, q0, X,
Σc ∪ Σu, E, Inv) be a TGA, with Σc (resp. Σu) the set of controllable (resp. uncon-
trollable) actions, and bad a location to avoid. We define A′ by adding to A two uncon-
trollable transitions: (bad, true, h, ∅, qh) and (qh, true, l, ∅, ql) where qh and ql are fresh
locations with invariant true. l and h are two fresh uncontrollable actions inA′. We now
define Σh = {h} and Σl = Σc∪Σu∪{l} for A′. By definition of A′, for any controller
C, if location Bad is not reachable in C(A′), then the actions h and then l can not be
fired. Thus if there is controller for C for A which avoids Bad, the same controller C
renders A′ SNNI. Now if there is a controller C ′ s.t. C ′(A′) is SNNI, it must never en-
able h: otherwise a (untimed) word w.h.l would be in Untimed(L(C ′(A′)/Σh)) but as
no untimed word containing an l can be in Untimed(L(C ′(A′)\Σh)), and thus C ′(A′)
would not be SNNI. Notice that it does not matter whether we require the controllers to
be non blocking (mappings from Runs(A) to 2Σc∪{λ} \ ∅) or not as the reduction holds
in any case. 
To compute the most permissive controller (and we will also prove there is one), we
build a safety game and solve a safety control problem. It may be necessary to iterate
this procedure. Of course, we restrict our attention to TA in the class dTA for which the
SNNI-VP is decidable.
Let A = (Q, q0, X,Σh ∪Σl, E, Inv) be a TA s.t. A\Σh is deterministic. The idea
of the reduction follows from the following remark: we want to find a controller C
s.t. L(C(A)\Σh) = L(C(A)/Σh). For any controller C we have L(C(A)\Σh) ⊆
L(C(A)/Σh) because each run of C(A)\Σh is a run of C(A)/Σh). To ensure SNNI
we must have L(C(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh): indeed, A\Σh is the largest language that
can be generated with no Σh actions, so a necessary condition for enforcing SNNI
is L(C(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh). The controller C(A) indicates what must be pruned
out in A to ensure the previous inclusion. Our algorithm thus proceeds as follows: we
first try to find a controller C1 which ensures that L(C1(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh). If
L(C1(A)/Σh) = L(A\Σh) then C1 is the most permissive controller that enforces
SNNI. It could be that what we had to prune out to ensure L(C1(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh)
does not renderC1(A) SNNI. In this case we may have to iterate the previous procedure
on the new system C1(A).
9
We first show how to compute C1. As A\Σh is deterministic, we can construct
A2 = (Q ∪ {qbad}, q
2
0 , X2, Σh ∪ Σl, E2, Inv2) which is a copy of A (with clock re-
naming) with qbad being a fresh location and s.t. A2 is a complete (i.e., L(A2) = TΣ∗)
version of A\Σh (A2 is also deterministic). We write last2(w) the state (q, v) reached
in A2 after reading a timed word w ∈ TΣ∗. A2 has the property that w ∈ L(A\Σh) if
the state reached in A2 after reading w is not in Bad with Bad = {(qbad, v) | v ∈ RX+}.
Fact 1 Let w ∈ TΣ∗. Then w 6∈ L(A\Σh) ⇐⇒ last2(w) ∈ Bad.
We now define the product Ap = A ×Σl A2 and the set of bad states, Bad⊗ of Ap
to be the set of states where A2 is in Bad. −→p denotes the transition relation of the
semantics of Ap and s0p the initial state of Ap. When it is clear from the context we omit
the subscript p in −→p.
Lemma 1. Let w ∈ L(A). Then there is a run ρ ∈ Runs(Ap) s.t. ρ = s0p
w
−−→p s with
s ∈ Bad⊗ iff πΣl(w) 6∈ L(A\Σh).
The proof follows easily from Fact 1. Given a run ρ in Runs(Ap), we let ρ|1 be the
projection of the run ρ on A (uniquely determined) and ρ|2 be the unique run4 in A2
whose trace is πΣl(trace(ρ)). The following Theorem proves that any controller C
s.t. C(A) is SNNI can be used to ensure that Bad⊗ is not reachable in the game Ap:
Lemma 2. Let C be a controller for A s.t. C(A) is SNNI. Let C⊗ be a controller on
Ap defined by C⊗(ρ′) = C(ρ′|1). Then, Reach(C⊗(Ap)) ∩ Bad⊗ = ∅.
Proof. First C⊗ is well-defined because ρ′|1 is uniquely defined. Let C be a controller
for A s.t. C(A) is SNNI. Assume Reach(C⊗(Ap)) ∩ Bad⊗ 6= ∅. By definition, there is
a run ρ′ in Runs(C⊗(Ap)) such that:
ρ′ = ((q0, q
2
0), (0,0))
e1−−→ ((q1, q
′
1), (v1, v
′
1))
e2−−→ · · ·
en−−→ ((qn, q
′
n), (vn, v
′
n))
en+1
−−−→ ((qn+1, q
′
n+1), (vn+1, v
′
n+1))
with ((qn+1, q′n+1), (vn+1, v′n+1)) ∈ Bad⊗ and we can assume (q′i, v′i) 6∈ Bad for
1 ≤ i ≤ n (and q20 6∈ Bad). Let ρ = ρ′|1 and w = πΣl(trace(ρ′)) = πΣl(trace(ρ)). We
can prove (1): ρ ∈ Runs(C(A)) and (2): w 6∈ L(C(A)\Σh). (1) directly follows from
the definition of C⊗. This implies that w ∈ L(C(A)/Σh). (2) follows from Lemma 1.
By (1) and (2) we obtain that w ∈ L(C(A)/Σh) \ L(C(A)\Σh) i.e., L(C(A)/Σh) 6=
L(C(A)\Σh) and so C(A) does not have the SNNI property which is a contradiction.
Hence Reach(C⊗(Ap)) ∩ Bad⊗ = ∅. 
If we have a controller which solves the safety game (Ap,Bad⊗), we can build a con-
troller which ensures that L(C(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh). Notice that as emphasized be-
fore, this does not necessarily ensure that C(A) is SNNI.
Lemma 3. LetC⊗ be a controller forAp s.t. Reach(C⊗(Ap))∩Bad⊗ = ∅. LetC(ρ) =
C⊗(ρ′) if ρ′|1 = ρ. C is well-defined and L(C(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh).
4 Recall that A2 is deterministic.
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Proof. Let ρ = (q0,0) e1−−→ (q1, v1) e2−−→ · · · en−−→ (qn, vn) be a run of A. Since
A2 is deterministic and complete there is exactly one run ρ′ = ((q0, q0), (0,0))
e1−−→
((q1, q
′
1), (v1, v
′
1))
e2−−→ · · ·
en−−→ ((qn, q
′
n), (vn, v
′
n)) in Ap s.t. ρ′|1 = ρ. So C is well-
defined. Now, assume there is some w ∈ L(C(A)/Σh) \ L(A\Σh). Then, there is a
run ρ in Runs(C(A)) ⊆ Runs(A) s.t. πΣl(trace(ρ)) = w, there is a unique run ρ ∈
Runs(Ap) s.t. ρ′|1 = ρ and trace(ρ′) = w. First by Lemma 1, last(ρ′) ∈ Bad
⊗
. Second,
this run ρ′ is in Runs(C⊗(Ap)) because of the definition ofC. Hence Reach(C⊗(Ap))∩
Bad⊗ 6= ∅ which is a contradiction. 
It follows that if C⊗ is the most permissive controller for Ap then C(A) is a timed
automaton (and can be effectively computed) because the most permissive controller for
safety timed games is memoryless. More precisely, let RG(Ap) be the the region graph
of Ap. C is memoryless on RG(Ap\Σh) because A2 is deterministic. The memory
required by C is at most RG(A\Σh) on the rest of the region graph of RG(Ap).
Assume the safety game (Ap,Bad⊗) can be won and C⊗ is the most permissive
controller. Let C be the controller obtained using Lemma 3. Controller C ensures that
L(C(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh). But as the following example shows, it may be the case
that C(A) is not SNNI.
Example 4. Consider the TA K of Figure 5 with Σh = {h} and Σc = {a}.
We can compute C(K) from C⊗ which sat-
0
1 2 3
4 3
a, x ≥ 2
h
h b
a, x ≥ 2
Fig. 5. The Automaton K
isfies Reach(C⊗(K ×Σl K2)) ∩ Bad⊗ =
∅, and is given by the sub-automaton of K
with the plain arrows. C(K) is obviously
not SNNI. For the example of A(1) in Fig-
ure 1, if we compute C in the same manner,
we obtain C(A(1)) = A(2) and moreover
L(C(A(1))/Σh) = L(A(1)\Σh). And then
the most permissive sub-system which is SNNI is given by C(A(1)) = A(2) (the guard
x ≥ 1 of A(1) is strenghtened). 
The example of Figure 5 shows that computing the most permissive controller on
Ap is not always sufficient. Actually, we may have to iterate the computation of the
most permissive controller on the reduced system C(A).
Lemma 4. Consider the controller C as defined in Lemma 3. If C(A)\Σh ≈ A\Σh
then C(A) is SNNI.
Proof. If C(A)\Σh ≈ A\Σh, then, L(C(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh) = L(C(A)\Σh). As
L(C(A)\Σh) ⊆ L(C(A)/Σh) is always true, L(C(A)/Σh) = L(C(A)\Σh) and so,
C(A) is SNNI. 
Let ⊥ be the symbol that denotes non controllability (or the non existence of a
controller). We inductively define the sequence of controllers Ci and timed automata
Ai as follows:
– let C0 be the controller defined by C0(ρ) = 2Σc∪{λ} and A0 = C0(A) = A;
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– LetAip = Ai×ΣlAi2 andC⊗i+1 be the most permissive controller for the safety game
(Aip,Bad⊗i ) (⊥ if no such controller exists). We use the notation Bad⊗i because
this set depends on Ai2. We define Ci+1 using Lemma 3: Ci+1(ρ) = C⊗i+1(ρ′) if
ρ′|1 = ρ. Let A
i+1 = Ci+1(Ai).
By Lemma 4, if Ci+1(Ai)\Σh ≈ Ai\Σh then Ci+1(Ai) is SNNI. Therefore this con-
dition is a sufficient condition for the termination of the algorithm defined above:
Lemma 5. There exists an index i ≥ 1 s.t. Ci(Ai−1) is SNNI or Ci = ⊥.
Proof. We prove that the region graph of Ci+1(Ai) is a subgraph of the region graph
of C1(A0) for i ≥ 1. By Lemma 3 (and the remark following it), C1(A0) is a subgraph
of RG(A×A2). Moreover C1 is memoryless on A\Σh and requires a memory of less
than |RG(A\Σh)| on the remaining part. Assume on this part, a node of RG(A×A2)
is of the form ((q, r), k) where q is a location of A and r a region of A and k ∈
{1, |RG(A\Σh)|}.
Assume RG(Ak) is a subgraph of RG(Ak−1) for k ≥ 2 and RG(Ak−1\Σh) is
subgraph of RG(A\Σh). Using Lemma 3, we can compute Ak = Ck(Ak−1) and:
(1) RG(Ak\Σh) is a subgraph of Ak−1\Σh and (2) the memory needed for C⊗k on
the remaining part is less than |RG(Ak−1)|. Actually, because Ak−1\Σh is determ-
inistic, no more memory is required for Ck. Indeed, the memory corresponds to the
nodes of Ak\Σh. Thus a node of RG(Ak) which is not in RG(Ak\Σh) is of the form
((q, r), k, k′) with k = k′ or k′ = qbad. This implies that RG(Ak) is a subgraph of
RG(Ak−1).
The most permissive controllerC⊗i will either disable at least one controllable trans-
ition of Ai−1p \Σh or keep all the controllable transitions of Ai−1p \Σh. In the latter case
Ai\Σh = A
i−1\Σh and otherwise |RG(Ai\Σh)| < |RG(Ai−1\Σh)|. This can go on
at most |RG(A\Σh)| steps. In the end either Ai\Σh = Ai−1\Σh and this implies that
Ai\Σh ≈ A
i−1\Σh (Lemma 4) or it is impossible to control Ai−1 and Ci = ⊥. In any
case, our algorithm terminates in less than |RG(A)| steps. 
To prove that we obtain the most permissive controller which enforces SNNI, we
use the following Lemma:
Lemma 6. If M is a controller such that L(M(A)/Σh) = L(M(A)\Σh), then ∀i ≥ 0
and ∀ρ ∈ Runs(A), M(ρ) ⊆ Ci(ρ).
Proof. The proof is by induction:
– for i = 0 it holds trivially.
– Assume the Lemma holds for indices up until i. Thus we have Runs(M(A)) ⊆
Runs(Ai). Therefore, we can define M over Ai and M(Ai) is SNNI. By Lemma 2,
M⊗ is a controller for the safety game (Aip,Bad⊗i ), therefore M⊗(ρ′) ⊆ C
⊗
i+1(ρ
′)
because C⊗i+1 is the most permissive controller. This implies that M(ρ) ⊆ Ci+1(ρ)
by definition of Ci+1. 
Using Lemma 5, the sequence Ci converges to a fix-point. Let C∗ denote this fix-point.
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Lemma 7. C∗ is the most permissive controller for the SNNI-CSP.
Proof. Either C∗ = ⊥ and there is no way of enforcing SNNI (Lemma 2), or C∗ 6= ⊥
is such that L(C∗(A)/Σh) = L(C∗(A)\Σh) by Lemma 3. As for any valid controller
M such that L(M(A)/Σh) = L(M(A)\Σh) we have M(ρ) ⊆ C∗(ρ) for each ρ ∈
Runs(A) (Lemma 6) the result follows. 
Lemma 5 proves the existence of a bound on the number of times we have to solve
safety games. For a timed automaton A in dTA, let |A| be the size of A.
Lemma 8. For a dTA A, C∗ can be computed in O(24.|A|).
Proof. As the proof of Lemma 5 shows, the region graph of Ai is a subgraph of the
region graph of A1, ∀i ≥ 1, and the algorithm ends in less than |RG(A)| steps. Com-
puting the most permissive controller for Aip avoiding Bad⊗i can be done in linear time
in the size of the region graph of Aip. As RG(Ai) is a subgraph of RG(A1), RG(Aip)
is a subgraph of RG(A1p). So we have to solve at most |RG(A)| safety games of sizes
at most |RG(A1p)|. As A1 is a subgraph of A0p = A0 ×Σl A02, |RG(A1)| ≤ |RG(A)|2.
And as A1p = A1 ×Σl A12, |RG(A1p)| ≤ |RG(A)|3. So, C∗ can be computed in
O(|RG(A)|.|RG(A1p)|) = O(|RG(A)|
4) = O(24.|A|). 
Theorem 4. For dTA, the SNNI-CP and SNNI-CSP are EXPTIME-complete.
For the special case of finite automata we even have:
Lemma 9. For finite automata C∗ = C2.
Proof. We know that L(C2(A)\Σh) ⊆ L(C1(A)\Σh). Suppose that ∃w s.t. w ∈
L(C1(A)\Σh) and w 6∈ L(C2(A)\Σh) (w cannot not be the empty word). We can
assume that w = u.l with u ∈ Σ∗l , l ∈ Σl ∩ Σc and u ∈ L(C1(A)\Σh) and
u.l 6∈ L(C2(A)\Σh) (l is the first letter which witnesses the non membership prop-
erty). If l had to be pruned in the computation of C2, it is because there is a word u.l.m
with m ∈ Σ∗u s.t. πΣl(u.l.m) ∈ L(C1(A)/Σh) but πΣl(u.l.m) 6∈ L(C1(A)\Σh). But
by definition of C1, L(C1(A)/Σh) ⊆ L(A\Σh) (Lemma 3) and thus πΣl(u.l.m) ∈
L(A\Σh). As u.l ∈ Σ∗l , πΣl(u.l.m) = u.l.πΣl(m) and πΣl(m) ∈ Σ∗u. Since u.l ∈
L(C1(A)\Σh) and πΣl(m) ∈ Σ∗u, we have u.l.πΣl(m) ∈ L(C1(A)\Σh) which is a
contradiction. Thus L(C2(A)\Σh) = L(C1(A)\Σh) which is our stoping condition
by lemma 4 and thus C∗ = C2. 
It follows that when A\Σh is deterministic, A a finite automaton, the SNNI-CSP is
PSPACE-complete. As untimed automata can always be determinized, we can extend
our algorithm to untimed automata when A\Σh non-deterministic. It suffices to de-
terminize Ai2, i = 1, 2:
Theorem 5. For a finite automaton A such that A\Σh is non deterministic, the SNNI-
CSP can be solved in EXPTIME.
Proposition 1. There is a family of FA (Ai)i≥0 such that: (i) there is a most permissive
controller D∗i s.t. D∗i (Ai) is SNNI and (ii) the memory required by D∗i is exponential
in the size of Ai.
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Proof. Let A be a finite automaton over the alphabet Σ. Define the automaton A′ as
given by Figure 6. Assume the automaton B is the sub-automaton of A′ with initial
state q′0. We take Σh = {h} = Σu and Σl = Σ = Σc. The most permissive controller
D s.t. D(A′) is SNNI generates the largest sub-language of L(A′) s.t. L(A′\Σh) =
L(A′/Σh) and thus it generates L(A) = L(A′\Σh).
The controller D is memoryless on A′\Σh as emphasized in Lemma 3. It needs
finite memory on the remaining part i.e., on B. The controller D on B gives for each
run a set of events of Σ that can be enabled: D(q0
h
−−→ q′0
w
−−→ q′0) = X with w ∈ Σ∗
and X ⊆ Σl.As B is deterministic, D needs only the knowledge of w and we can write
D(hw) ignoring the states of A′. For B we can even write D(w) instead of D(hw).
Define the equivalence relation ≡ on Σ∗ by: w ≡ w′ if D(w) = D(w′). Denote the
class of a word w by [w]. Because D is memory bounded, Σ∗/≡ is of finite index which
is exactly the memory needed by D.
Thus we can define an automaton D/≡ =
•
q0
•
q′0
h
Σl
A
Fig. 6. Automaton B
(M, m0, Σ,→) by: M = {[w] | w ∈ Σ∗},
m0 = [ε], and [w]
a
−−→ [wa] for a ∈ D(hw).
D/≡ is an automaton which acceptsL(A) (and it
is isomorphic to D(B)) and the size of which is
the size of D because B has only one state. This
automaton is deterministic and thus D/≡ is also
deterministic and accepts L(A). There is a fam-
ily (Ai)i≥0 of non-deterministic FA, such that
the deterministic and language-equivalent auto-
maton of each Ai requires at least exponential size. For each of these Ai we construct
the controller Di/≡ as described before, and this controller must have at least an expo-
nential size (w.r.t. to Ai). This proves the EXPTIME lower bound. 
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have studied the strong non-deterministic non-interference control
problem (SNNI-CP) and control synthesis problem (SNNI-CSP) in the timed setting.
The main results we have obtained are: (1) the SNNI-CP can be solved if A\Σh can be
determinized and is undecidable otherwise; (2) the SNNI-CSP can be solved by solving
a finite sequence of safety games if A\Σh can be determinized.
A Timed Automaton A Finite Automaton
A\Σh Non-Det. A\Σh Det. A\Σh Non-Det. A\Σh Det.
SNNI-VP undecidable PSPACE-C PSPACE-C PTIME
SNNI-CP undecidable EXPTIME-C PSPACE-C PTIME
SNNI-CSP undecidable EXPTIME-C EXPTIME PSPACE-C
Table 2. Summary of the Results
The summary of the results is given in Table 2. For non-deterministic FA, we have
proved that EXPTIME is a lower bound.
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Our future work will consist in extending this work to other types of non-interference
properties, CSNNI and BSNNI which are more involved than SNNI. Indeed, there is
not always a least restrictive controller for (bi)simulation based non-interference. Thus
it is interesting to determine conditions under which a least restrictive controller exists
for the BSNNI-CSP and CSNNI-CSP.
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